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Abst ract - - In  this article, we shall present an authenticated key agreement protocol which is a 
modified and faster version of the Yeh-Sun scheme. Compared with the latest Kobara-Imai scheme, 
our scheme takes fewer steps and less computation cost. Besides, we shall also propose a protected 
password change protocol that allows users to change their own passwords freely. (~) 2005 Elsevier 
Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid progress of networks facilitates more and more computers to connect ogether to 
exchange large amounts of information and share system resources. A session key is established 
to provide confidentiality of communication over an open network. The famous Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement scheme [1] is used to establish a session key between two parties over an insecure 
network. However, the scheme is vulnerable to the man-in-middle attack because the adversary 
can impersonate party  A to party B and vice versa. In this case, user authentication plays an 
important  role in making the Diffie-Hellman scheme more secure. 
In 1998, Law et el. [2] proposed the MQV protocol, which is protected under the public key 
infrastructure (PKI).  Smart [3] and Yi [4] further proposed identity-based authenticated key 
agreement protocols based on Welt pairing to obtain lower communication overhead and less 
computat ion complexity. 
However, the involved certification management, cryptography calculation, and the additional 
communication overhead caused by the digital signature. Because of the convenience of pass- 
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words such as natural anguage phrases that people can recognize without any assisting devices, 
password authentication schemes are simple and practical solutions to user identification. 
By using a preshared password technique along with the Diffie-Hellman scheme, Seo and 
Sweeney [5] proposed a simple authenticated key agreement (SAKA) protocol without any sym- 
metric cryptosystems ( uch as DES [6,7], Rijndael [8], and others [9]) or asymmetric cryptosys- 
terns (such as RSA [10,11], E1Camal [12,13], etc.). Two parties online can use a preshared 
password technique to authenticate each other and apply the Diffie-Hellman scheme to establish 
a session key. Unfortunately, passwords are weak as secrets because they come from a rather lim- 
ited set of possibilities; they are vulnerable to the password guessing attacks (dictionary attacks). 
Sun [14], Tseng [15], and Lu et al. [16] separately showed that the Seo-Sweeney SAKA scheme is 
insecure under the threat of the replay attack and off-line password guessing attack. At the same 
time, Lin et al. [17] and Tseng [15] separately proposed an improvement on the Seo-Sweeney 
SAKA scheme to withstand these attacks. However, Hsieh et al. [18] have pointed out that Lin 
et al.'s is still vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack. On the other hand, Ku and 
Wang [19] have also shown that Tseng's cheme is vulnerable to the backward replay attack [20] 
and modification attack, and they gave an improvement on Tseng's cheme in the meantime. 
In 2004, Yang et al. [21] examined all SAKA-related schemes [5,15,17,19] and mounted a 
modification attack on those schemes to successfully cheat the two parties into believing in the 
wrong session key. Table 1 below is a summary table of the security of all those schemes. 
Recently, Yeh and Sun [22], and Kobara and Imai [23] have also combined the preshared password 
technique and the Diffie-Hellman scheme to achieve the same purpose the SAKA scheme intends 
to, respectively. Both schemes can withstand those attacks hown in Table 1 and provide perfect 
forward secrecy [24]. Lee et al. [25] further proposed the parallel version of the Yeh-Sun scheme. 
Two parties in their scheme compute the message during the protocol simultaneously. In fact, the 
scheme still need that one of two parties to send out the request message first and then another 
one knows to prepare the reply message. Hence, the protocol is not real parallel. 
In this paper, we shall present a simpler authenticated key agreement protocol by modifying 
the Yeh-Sun scheme, and we shall also present a new protected password change protocol which 
unlike the previously proposed schemes [5,15,17,19,22,23] where the parties cannot arbitrarily 
change their own passwords, offers users the freedom of changing passwords at will. Moreover, 
compared with the latest Kobara-Imai scheme, our key agreement protocol takes fewer steps and 
less computation cost. Moreover, we not only give the heuristic security analysis, but also 
Table 1. Summary of related schemes in SAKA. 
Seo-Sweeney Tseng Line$ al. Ku-Wang 
[5] [15] [17] [19] 
Withstand Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Man-In-Middle Attack 
Withstand *No. [16,14] *No. [21] *No. [18] *No. [21] 
Dictionary Attack 
Withstand *No [15] Yes Yes Yes 
Replay Attack 
Withstand *No. [19] *No. [19] Yes Yes 
Backward Replay Attack 
Withstand *No. [21] *No. [19,21] *No. [21] *No. [21] 
Modification Attack 
Provide *No [14] Yes Yes *No. [21] 
Perfect Forward Secrecy 
*No [reference]: [reference] points out that the scheme cannot 
withstand/achieve th  attack/perfect forward secrecy. 
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formally proven using Ballare, Poincheval and Rogaway's model (called BPR model for short) 
[26]. The provable security is demonstrated byreduction (see [26] for more detailed escription). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will briefly review 
the Kobara-Imai scheme. Then, our modified Yeh-Sun key agreement protocol and new protected 
password change protocol will be presented in Section 3. The security of our schemes will be 
analyzed in Section 4. After that, we will compare the performance ofour key agreement protocol 
with that of the Kobara-Imal scheme in Section 5. Finally, the concluding remarks will be made 
in Section 6. 
2. REVIEW OF THE KOBARA- IMAI  SCHEME 
The system publishes two large prime numbers p and q, such that q divides p - 1. Let gl and 
g2 be two generators with order q in the Galois field CF(p) [23]. Assume that Alice and Bob 
share a secret password (pw) and three predetermined distinct values Tag A = (id AII idB II 01), 
Tag B = (ida II idB II 10) and TagAB = (ida II idB II 11), where idA and idB are separately 
identities of Alice and Bob, and II denotes the concatenation. Their key agreement protocol 
includes the following steps. 
Step 1. Alice ~Bob: R A 
pw Alice chooses a random number a C [1, q -  1], computes RA = g~ "g2 mod p, and 
sends RA to Bob. 
Step 2. Bob ~Alice: RB 
pw Bob chooses a random number b C [1, q - 1], computes RB = g~ "g2 mod p, and 
sends RB to Alice. 
Alice and Bob use the received RB and RA to compute KA -= (RB • g2PW) a mod p and Ks  = 
(RA • g~-pw)b mod p, respectively. 
Step 3. Alice---*Bob: MACKA(TagA I] RA H RB) 
Alice computes MACKA(TagA N RA H RB) and sends it to Bob, where MACK(.) 
is a message authentication code [27] and the keying materials as its key K. 
Step 4. Bob ~Alice: MACKB(Tags ]1RA II RB) 
Bob computes MACKB (Tag B 11 RA II RB) and sends it to Alice. 
Alice and Bob respectively verify whether the received MACKs (Tag B I]RA I] RB) is equal to 
MACKA(TagB [I RAN RB) and whether the received MACKa (Tag AII RA II RB) is equal to 
MACKB (Tag A ]1 RA ]l RB) or not. If the equations hold, Alice and Bob agree on the common 
session key Key = MACKA(TagAB IJ RAII RB) = MACK~(TagAB tl RAII Rs), where KA = 
Ks  = g~b rood p. 
3. OUR PROPOSED SCHEMES 
In this section, we shall show our key agreement protocol and protected password change 
protocol in such order in the following subsections. 
3.1. Simple Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol 
Here, the same parameters {p, q, pw} in the Kobara-Imal scheme are used, but there is only 
one generator g with order q in GF(p) used in our schemes. 
Step 1. Alice ~Bob: RA ® pw 
Alice chooses a random number a C [1, q - 1], computes RA = ga mod p, and sends 
RA ~) pw to Bob, where @ denotes the exclusive operator. 
Step 2. Bob ~Alice: R B II H(KB, RA) 
After receiving RA ~ pw, Bob recovers RA by computing (RA ~ pw) • pw. Then 
Bob chooses a random number b E [1 ,q -  1], computes RB = gb modp, KB = 
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RbA = gab mod p, and sends RB H H(KB, RA) to Alice, where H(.) is a secure 
one-way hash function. 
Step 3. A l ice ~Bob: H(KA, RB) 
After receiving RB II H(KB, RA), Alice computes KA = RaB -~ gab modp and 
verifies whether the received H(KB, RA) is equal to H(KA, RA) or not. If it is, 
Alice computes H(KA, RB) and sends it to Bob. 
After receiving H(KA, RB), Bob verifies whether it is equal to H(KB, RB) or not. If it is, Alice 
and Bob agree on the common session key Key = H(KA) = H(KB) = H(g ab mod p). 
The difference between the original Yeh-Sun scheme and our proposed scheme is that Bob 
sends RB II H(KB, RA) to Alice in our scheme, while the message is RB @ pw II H(KB, RA) in 
the Yeh-Sun scheme. Since only Bob, who knows pw, has the ability to recover RA and then 
compute the valid H(KB,RA) and send it to Alice in Step 2, RB need not do any XOR with 
pw; it can be directly sent to Alice. Hence, Bob's computational complexity can be reduced 
by one XOR operation, and Alice's computational complexity can also be reduced by one XOR 
operation (She does not compute (RB @ pw) @ pw to recover RB.) in our scheme. 
3.2. Protected Password Change Protocol 
Assume that Alice wants to change her old password pw to a new password new pw, she needs 
to follow these steps. 
Step 1". Alice----~Bob: RA @ pw II RA ® newpw 
Alice chooses a random number a 6 [1, q - 1], computes RA = g~ rood p and sends 
R A ~)pw ]1RA @ newpw to Bob. 
Step 2*. Bob---+Alice: RB ]] H(Ks, RA) 
After receiving RA@pw II RA@newpw, Bob recovers RA by computing (RA®pw)@ 
pw and uses the recovered RA to obtain new pw by computing (RA @new pw)@ RA. 
Then Bob chooses a random number b C [1, q - 1], computes RB = gb mod p and 
KB = R b = gab mod p, and sends RB ]l H(KB, RA) to  Alice. 
Step 3*. Alice---~Bob: H(KA, RB) @ newpw 
After receiving RB II H(KB, RA), Alice computes KA = R~B = gab mod p and 
verifies whether the received H(KB, RA) is equal to H(KA, RA) or not. If it holds, 
Alice computes H(KA, RB) @ new pw and sends it to Bob. 
After receiving H(KA,RB)~ newpw, Bob uses the recovered newpw in Step 2* to obtain 
H(KA, RB) by computing (H(KA, RB) @ new pw) @ new pw. Then he verifies whether the recov- 
ered H(KA, RB) is equal to H(KB, RB) or not. If it is, Alice and Bob have successfully changed 
their old password (pw) to the new password (new pw). 
4. SECURITY  ANALYS IS  
In this section, we show the heuristic security analysis and the provable security analysis in 
the following sections, respectively. 
4.1. Heuristic Security Analysis 
Several possible attacks will be raised and fought against o demonstrate the security of our 
schemes. Here, we assume that Eve is an adversary. Our security definitions are as follows. 
DEFINITION i. Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is that giving ga mod p and gb mod p 
to compute gab rood p is hard. 
DEFINITION 2. The computational ssumption of a one-way hash function Y = H(X) is that 
giving Y to compute X is hard. 
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MAN-IN-MIDDLE ATTACK ANALYSIS. Obviously, the password pw shared between Alice and 
Bob is used against the main-in-middle attack. Without knowing pw, Eve has no ability to 
interpose in the line and impersonate Bob to Alice and Alice to Bob. 
PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK ANALYSIS. The on-line password guessing attack can be pre- 
vented easily by limiting the number of failed runs. On the other hand, the off-line password 
guessing attack is also favored by the attacker. Eve tries to find out the weak password by 
repeatedly guessing a possible password and verifying the correctness of the guess via obtained 
information in an off-line manner. From the key agreement protocol, Eve gets the knowledge of 
RAG pw, RB I[ H(KB, RA), and H(KA, RB) separately in Steps 1, 2, and 3. She first guesses a
password pw / and then finds RA ---- RA O pw • pw t. Assume that the length of RA is 1024 bits 
and pw is 20 bytes. The probability of guessing RA and pw is less than 1/2 l°24 x 1/22°'s. Then 
Eve has to break the Diffle-Hellman assumption to find KB (= KA) and use it to verify her guess 
password. For the same reason, without knowing R A and KA(-~ KB), Eve cannot guess newpw 
from RA (~ newpw in Step 1" and H(KA,RB) ®newpw in Step 3'.  
REPLAY ATTACK ANALYSIS. Eve intercepts RA(~)pw when it is sent by Alice in Step 1 and uses it 
to masquerade as Alice next time. However, Eve cannot compute a correct H(KA, RB) to Bob in 
Step 3 because she has no pw to obtain RA and then compute a from RA = ga mod p by solving 
the discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, if Eve intercepts RB II H(KB, RA) when it 
is sent by Bob in Step 2 and uses it to masquerade as Bob, obviously, R A generated by Alice is 
different for each protocol, so Eve still cannot replay RB II H(KB, RA) to Alice. For the same 
reason, the protected password change protocol can also withstand the replay attack. Because 
some messages sent between the two parties are the same in [5,15], the schemes are vulnerable to 
the replay attack and backward replay attack. Nevertheless, the messages sent by Alice and Bob 
are different in both of our schemes, and therefore, Eve cannot intercept any message between 
them and then replay it to the other side. 
MODIFICATION ATTACK ANALYSIS. Eve tries to modify the messages transferred between Al- 
ice and Bob and makes them believe in a wrong session key. Unlike 8AKA-related schemes 
[5,15,17,19], our schemes have the XOR operation and a one-way hash function to protect he 
messages transferred between Alice and Bob. Eve cannot replace the original value sent by Alice 
with a new one and then use its inversion to make Bob return to the original value. Therefore, 
Yang et al.'s modification attack [21] cannot hreaten the security of our key agreement protocol. 
In our protected password change protocol, Eve modifies RA ~new pw to a random number RE in 
Step 1". After receiving RAG pw II RE, Bob recovers RA and uses it to obtain the new password 
RE @ RA and sends RB ]1 H(KB, RA) to Alice in Step 2*. Then Alice first verifies the received 
H(Ks, RA) and sends H(KA, RB) G new pw to Bob in Step 3*. Then Bob uses the recovered 
new password RE @ RA to compute H(KA,RB) ~ newpw G (RE • RA) and compare it with 
H(KB, Rs). Obviously, H(KA, RB) ®newpw ® (RE ~ RA) is not equal to H(KB, RB). Bob will 
reject the password changing request unless Eve can compute H(KA, RB) @ (RE @ RA) and send 
it to Bob in Step 3*. However, she has no ability to obtain KA and RA. 
According to the above analyses, our schemes can withstand all those attacks hown in Table 1. 
Moreover, even when the password is compromised in our scheme, Eve may reveal RA = ga rood p 
and R B : gb rood p, but she still cannot reveal the old session key Key = H(g ab mod p). On the 
other hand, a stolen session key does not help an adversary to carry out a brute-force guessing 
attack on the password because KA and KB are under the protection of the one-way hash function 
H(.). In a word, our new scheme lives up to the requirement of perfect forward secrecy. 
4.2. P rovab le  Secur i ty  Analysis 
In this section, we shall employ and simplify the BPR model (see [26] for a more detailed 
description) to formally prove the security of SAKA and PPC in the random oracle model (ideal 
hash model). 
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4.2.1. Mode l  
The model is principally used formally as follows. 
1. DEFINE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPATING ENTITIES. 
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS. A party may have several instances, called oracles, involved in dis- 
tinct concurrent executions of the protocols. We denote some instance i with an identifier A as 
1-ih. 
LONG-LIVED KEYS. Two parties A and B share a common password pw. We call pw long-lived 
key and assume that the password is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the 
set {1,. . . ,  N}, where N is a constant, independent of the security parameter. 
SESSION IDENTITY AND PARTNER IDENTITY. The session identity SID is used to uniquely name 
the ensuing session. SID(II~) is the concatenation f all flows with the oracle II~. PID(II~) = B, 
denoted as H~4 , is the communication with another participant B. Both SID and PID are publicly 
available. 
ACCEPTING AND TERMINATING. There are two states, ACC(II~) and TERM(H~), for an oracle 
II~4. ACC(H~) = true denotes that II~4 has enough information to compute a session key (SK). 
At any time an oracle can accept messages right away. As soon as II~ is accepted, SK(II~), 
SID(H~4 ) and PID(H~) are defined. When an oracle sends or receives the last message of the 
protocol, receives an invalid message, or misses an expected message, the state of TERM(II~) is 
set to true. As long as II:4 is terminated, no message will be sent out. 
2. DEFINE AN ADVERSARY'S CAPABILITIES. 
The adversary ,4 has an endless upply of oracles and models various queries to them. Each 
query models a capability of the adversary, such as forward secrecy, know-key security, etc. The 
six queries and their responses are listed below. 
• Send(II~, m): This query models A sending a message m to H~4. A gets back from his 
query the response which II~ would have generated in processing message m and updates 
SID, PID, and its state. A in the form Send(II~,start) initiates an execution of the 
protocol. 
• Execute(II~, H~): This query modelsA obtaining an honest execution of the SAKA pro- 
tocol in the middle of two oracles II~ and IIJB . Execute(H~, His) models ,4 obtaining an 
honest execution of the protocols between two oracles H~ and H~. This query may at 
first seem useless ince A already can carry out an honest execution among oracles. Yet, 
the query is essential for properly dealing with password guessing attacks. 
• Reveal(II~): This query models .Aobtaining a session key (SK) with an unconditional 
return by H~4. The query is for dealing with know-key security. The Reveal query is only 
available if the state ACC(H~) = true. 
• Corrupt(A): This query models A obtaining along-lived key pw with an unconditional 
return byA. The query is for dealing with forward secrecy. 
Initialize(1 k, lZ), where 1 and k are security parameters and 1 < k 
Select p, q primes with length [p[ = k, [q[ = l, and q ] p - 1; this defines group G; 
Choose random generator g ~-- G; 
Choose a hash function H(.) :  {0, 1}* ~ {0,1} t 
Publish parpmeters q,p, g, H(.); 
< pw >A,n~ {1, . . . ,N} 
Figure 1. Specification ofprotocol initialization. 
Simple Authenticated Key Agreement 709 
Execution (II ~ A, HJB) 
1. Send1 (IIJA,start) 
< a >R+_R._ Zq; RA = ga modp; msg__outl +-- RA • pw; stateJA +--< a, RA >; 
return msg__out 1
2. Send2 (II~,mj) 
< M1 >+- ml; RA +-- M1 ® pw; < h >+_R__R Zq; R B : gh modp; KB = (RA)  h modp 
msg_ out2 +--< RB II H(Kb, R - A) >; stateJB +---< Rb, KB >; 
return msg__out2 
3. Send3 (II{,m2) 
< RB, M2 >+- m2; < a, RA >+-- stateJn; KA ---- (RB)  a modp; 
if H(KA, RA = M2 
msg_ out3 +- H(KA, RB); 
SK(HJA) +--H(KA); SID(1-IJA) +--< msg__outl, m2,msg outa >; 
PID(1-IJA) +--B; ACC(1-I~A) +--true;TERM(IIiA) +--true 
else msg__out3 +- *; 
4. Send4 (II j ,  m3) 
< M3 >+- m3; < RB, KB >+-- stateJA; 
if H(KB, RB) = Ms 
SK(H j )  +-- H(Kb); SID(II~) ~-< ml,msg out2 >; 
PID(IIJB) +-- A; ACC(II~ +- true; TERM(II~) +-- true 
return null 
Figure 2. Specification f protocol SAKA. 
• Hash(m): In the ideal hash model, A gets hashresults by making queries to a random 
oracle. After receiving this query, the random oracle will check whether m has been 
queried. If so, it returns the result previously generated to ,4; otherwise it generates a 
random number and sends it to A, and stores (m, r) into the H-table, which is a record 
set used to record all previous hash queries. 
• Test(II~): This query models the semantiesecurity of the session key (SK) (the indistin- 
guishability between the real session key and a random string). During an execution of 
the protocol, J[ can make any of the above queries, and at once, asks for a test query. 
Then, H~ flips a coin b and returns SK if b -- 1 or a random string with length ISKI if 
b = 0. The query is only available if II~ is fresh..4 outputs a bit b I and wins the game 
of breaking the protocol if b = b'. 
3. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS. 
Figure 1 shows the initialization of both protocols. Figures 2 and 3 separately show how 
instances in the SAKA and PPC protocols behave in response to messages (runs the SAKA and 
PPC protocols). 
Before putting the protocols to work, each oracle sets ACC(II~) +-- TERM(YI~) +-- false; and 
SK(II~z ) +-- SID(II~}) +-- PID(II~) ~ null;. 
4.2.2. Definitions of security 
This section defines what constitutes the breaking of our SAKA and PPC protocols. To begin 
with, let's set the formal notions of security as follows. 
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Execution(II~A, HJB) 
1. Send1 (H~'A, start) 
< a >R+_R._ Zq; RA = g~ modp; msg__outl *--< RA ~ pw II RA • new pw >; 
state~ *---< a, RA >; 
return msg__out 1 
2. Send2 (IIJB,ml) 
< M1,M2 >+--ml;RA ~-Ml@pw;newpwe-M20RA;<b>~ R Zq; 
Rg = gb modp; Ka = (RA)bmodp; msg out2 ~ Rs II H(KB,RA) >; 
state~ ~--< new pw, RB,KB >; 
return msg out2 
3. Send3(Hi4 , m2) 
< a, RA >~- state~; < RB, M3 >*-- M2; KA -~ (RB) a modp; 
if H(KA, RA) = M3 
msg._out3 e- H(KA, RB) • newpw; 
SK(H~4) ~-H(KA); SID(II~)*--msg_outl, m2,msg_ out3 >; 
PID(II~) *-- B; ACC(H~) ~- true; TERM(II~) ~- true 
elsemsg out3*-*; 
a. Send4(II~, m3) 
< M4 >~'-- m3; < newpw, RB,KB >+-- stateS; 
if H(Ks,  Rs) = M4 
SK(H~) ~ H(KB); SID(IIJB) ~< ml,msg__out2, m3 >; 
PID(H~) ~ A; ACC(H~) ~- true; TERM(Hg) *- true 
return null 
Figure 3. Specification of protocol PPC. 
FRESHNESS. An oracle A is identified as fresh (or holds a fresh SK) if the following three condi- 
tions are satisfied: 
(1) II~4 has been accepted, 
(2) no oracle has been asked for a corrupt query before II~ is accepted, and 
(3) neither II~ nor its partner has been asked for a reveal query. 
PARTNERING. In SAKA and PPC protocols, we say two oracles H i and HJB are partnered if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) II~ and rI~ have been accepted, 
(2) SK(YI~) = SK(II/B), 
(3) SID(H~) n SID(H~) # 0, 
(4) PID(II~) = B and PID(H~) = A, and 
(5) no other oracle accepts SK = SK(H~) = SK(II~). 
AKE SECURITY (SESSION KEY SECURITY). We say ,4 has the probability Pr(w/n) to win a 
game of breaking the session key security of SAKA and PPC if A makes a single test query to 
a fresh oracle and correctly guesses the bit b used in the game. We separately denote the AKE 
advantage of ,4 in attacking SAKA and PPC as AdvsAKEA(A ) and AKE Advpp c (A); the advantages 
are taken over all bit tosses. The advantage of A distinguishing the session key is given by 
AKE AKE Advpp c (,4) 2Pr(win) - Protocols SAKA and PPC are AKE-secure if AdVSAKA (`4) = = 1. 
AKE AKE AdVSAKA(.A ) and Advpp C (,4) are negligible, respectively. 
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COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN (CDH) ASSUMPTION. Let G = (g) be a cyclic of prime 
order q and x, y chosen at random in Zq. Let B be a CDH attacker that given a challenge 
¢ = (gX,gy), and let ¢ be the probability that B can output an element z in G such that 
z = gZy. We denote this success probability as SuccCDH(B). The CDH problem is intractable if
SuccCDH(B) is negligible. 
ADVERSARY'S RESOURCES. The security can be formulated as a function of the amount of 
resources `4 obtains. The resources are as follows. 
• t :  time of computing; 
• qsei, qex, qre, qco, qh: the number of sendi, execute, reveal, corrupt, and hash queries epa- 
rately made. Here, q~e is the total number of qsei. 
4.2.3. Secur i ty  proof  
THEOREM 4.1. Let A be an adversary against the AKE-security of the SAKA protocol within 
a time bound t, after qse and qh. Then we have: 
AKE qse qseqhSuccCDH(tl) qse AdVsAKA(t, qse, qh) <-- -~" + + "~, 
where tl is the running time of Succ CDH. 
PROOF. There are three ways that might lead to ` 4 successfully attacking the AKE-security of the 
SAKA protocol. First, ` 4 might obtain the long-lived key and impersonate A or B by mounting 
the password guessing attack. Second, `4 might directly obtain the session key by solving the 
CDH problem. In the following, we shall analyze the probability of the two situations one by 
one. To analyze a situation, the others are assumed to be under some known probability. 
PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS. A and B separately chooses a C Zq and b C Zq at random, 
which implies RA and RB are random numbers. Hence, A observes that the message (RA @ pw) 
returned from send1 is independent ofother messages. Therefore, the adversary gets no advantage 
for the off-line password guessing attack. The probability of the on-line password guessing attack 
making way is bounded by qse and N as follows: 
<~ qse 
- -N  
The on-line guessing attack can be prevented by letting the server take the appropriate intervals 
between trials. Furthermore, we also provide the PPC protocol to allow clients to change their 
own passwords. 
CDH ATTACK (SESSION KEY). B plays the role of a simulator for indistinguishability. It uses 
the SAKA protocol to respond to all A's queries and deal with the CDH problem. B sets up 
the long-lived key pw, picks a random number i from [1,qsel], and sets a counter cnt = 0. 
When ` 4 makes send1, B answers according to the protocol to return msg_ouh to send1 and 
increases cnt by 1. If cnt ¢ i, B answers with msg_out2 to send2. If cnt = i, B answers with 
(gY H H(random I]g~)) by using the element g~ from the challenge ~b. When ` 4 makes senda, if 
the input is the flow corresponding to challenge ¢, B answers with (H(random, gY)} by using the 
element gY from the challenge ¢. If not, B answers with msg_outa to send3. 
When ` 4 makes a reveal(H~) or reveal(H/B), B checks whether the oracle has been accepted 
and is fresh. If so, B1 answers by using the session key SK. However, if the session key has 
to be constructed from the challenge ~b, B halts. When .4 makes a corrupt(A), corrupt(B) 
execute(H~, H/B), or hash(m), B answers in a straightforward way. When ,4 makes a single test 
query, B answers in a straightforward way. However, if the session key has to be constructed 
from the challenge ¢, B answers with a random string for the test(II~4 ) or test(H/B). 
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This simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from any execution of the real SAKA protocol 
except for one execution in which the challenge ¢ is involved. The probability a of B correctly 
guessing the session key ` 4 will use test(H~) is the probability of cnt= i. Then, we have: 
1 1 
qsel qse 
Assume that ` 4 has broken the CDH problem (.4, outputting b' after the test query, wins), 
then at least one of the hash queries equals SK. The probability of B correctly choosing among 
the possible hash queries is: 
1 
qh 
From the above description, the probability SuccCDH(B) that B outputs z from the challenge 
¢ is the probability s that .4 breaks the AKE-secure scheme multiplied by the probability a 
that B1 correctly guesses the moment at which ,4 breaks the AKE-secure scheme multiplied by 
the probability fl that B1 correctly chooses among the possible hash queries: 
1 1 
Succ$°H(~l )  = ~ x ~ × Z _> e × - -  × - - .  ( I )  
qse qh 
THEOREM 4.2. Let A be an adversary against the AKE-security of the PPC protocol within a 
time bound t, after qse and qh. Then we have: 
AKE q~e qseqhSucc~DH(tl) -b qse Advpp c (t, qse, qh) <-- -~  + 2- 7 ,  
where t1 is the running time of SUCC CDH. 
PaOOF. This proof is similar to the analysis of SAKA. We omit it here. 
5. EFF IC IENCY AND COMPARISON 
In this section, we shall compare the computational complexity of our key agreement protocol 
with that of the Kobara-Imai scheme. To analyze the computational complexity, we first define 
the following notations. 
TEXP the time for computing modular exponentiation. 
TMUL the time for computing modular multiplication. 
TMAC the time for computing the adopted MACK(.). 
TH the time for computing the adopted H(.). 
TXOR the time for computing the XOR operation of two numbers. 
Assume that in the Diffie-Hellman scheme's computation gC rood p, the length of the prime 
number p is 1024 bits, and the random number c is 160 bits. In our scheme, Alice computes 
(RA = g~ mod p) @ pw and sends it to Bob; it means the largest number of bytes for pw can be 
pw up to 128. Oppositely, when Alice computes g~ • g2 rood p and sends it to Bob, it means the 
largest number of bytes for pw is 20 in the Kobara-Imai scheme. Hence, the selectivity of pw in 
our scheme is more freedom (i.e., choose a sentence as a password). 
Table 2. Computational complexity comparisons between our scheme and the Ko- 
~ara-Imai scheme. 
Our Scheme Kobara-Imai Scheme 
Alice's computations 2TExP ÷ 3TH + 1TxoR 4TExP ~ 3TMAc -b 2TMuL 
Bob's computations 2TExP q- 3TH Jr 1TxoR 4TExP -k 3TMAc -b 2TMuL 
Steps required 3 4 
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For simplicity, to compare the computational complexities of our scheme and the Kobara- 
Imal scheme, we assume that the password length in both schemes is 20 bytes. To compute 
gC mod p by repeatedly squaring and multiplying requires an average of 240 1024-bit modular 
multiplications (i.e., 1TEXP = 240TMuL) [27]. According to Table 2, it is obvious that two 
parties' computational complexities in our scheme are more economical than in the Kobara-Imai 
scheme. Moreover, our scheme requires fewer steps to agree on a session key than the Kobara- 
Imai scheme, and we provide a password changing protocol. On the other hand, Alice and Bob 
should use predetermined values TagA, TagB, and TagAB to avoid the replay attack, backward 
replay attack (each message transferred is different) and generate a session key in the Kobara- 
Imai scheme. In our scheme, the distinct values RA and RB can easily be used to make each 
transferred message is different. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have proposed a slight improvement on the Yeh-Sun scheme to make it 
more efficient. In additional, we have designed a protected change password protocol to allow 
two parties to arbitrarily change their own password freely. Compared with other SAKA-related 
schemes, our schemes not only can withstand those attacks shown in Table 1 but also is more 
efficient. 
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